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We investigate two-way and one-way single-photon quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols
in the presence of loss introduced by the quantum channel. Our analysis is based on a simple
precondition for secure QKD in each case. In particular, the legitimate users need to prove that
there exists no separable state (in the case of two-way QKD), or that there exists no quantum state
having a symmetric extension (one-way QKD), that is compatible with the available measurements
results. We show that both criteria can be formulated as a convex optimisation problem known as
a semidefinite program, which can be efficiently solved. Moreover, we prove that the solution to
the dual optimisation corresponds to the evaluation of an optimal witness operator that belongs to
the minimal verification set of them for the given two-way (or one-way) QKD protocol. A positive
expectation value of this optimal witness operator states that no secret key can be distilled from the
available measurements results. We apply such analysis to several well-known single-photon QKD
protocols under losses.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols typically
involve a two-step procedure in order to generate a secret
key [1, 2]. First, the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) per-
form a set of measurements on effective bipartite quan-
tum states that are distributed to them. As a result,
they end up with a classical joint probability distribu-
tion, that we shall denote as p(ai, bj) ≡ pij , describing
their outcomes. The second step consists of a classical
post-processing of the data pij . It requires an authen-
ticated classical channel, and it includes post-selection
of data, error-correction to reconcile the data, and pri-
vacy amplification to decouple the data from a possible
eavesdropper (Eve) [1, 2].
In order to create the correlated data pij , QKD
schemes usually require Alice to prepare some non-
orthogonal quantum states |ψi〉 with a priori probabil-
ities pi that are sent to Bob. On the receiving side,
Bob measures each received signal with a positive op-
erator value measure (POVM) {Bj}. Generalising the
ideas introduced by Bennett et al. in Ref. [3], the sig-
nal preparation process in this kind of schemes can al-
ternatively be thought of as follows: Alice produces first
bipartite states |ψsource〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉A|ψi〉B and, af-
terwards, she measures the first subsystem in the orthog-
onal basis |αi〉A corresponding to the measurement op-
erators Ai = |αi〉A〈αi|. This action generates the signal
states |ψi〉 with a priori probabilities pi. The reduced
density matrix of Alice, ρA = TrB(|ψsource〉AB〈ψsource|),
depends only on the probabilities pi and on the overlap of
the signals states |ψi〉. This means, in particular, that ρA
is always fixed by the preparation process and cannot be
modified by Eve. In order to include this information in
the measurement process one can add to the observables
{Ai⊗Bj}, measured by Alice and Bob, other observables
{Ck ⊗ 1 } such that the observables {Ck} form a tomo-
graphic complete set of Alice’s Hilbert space [4]. From
now on, we will consider that the data pij and the POVM
{Ai ⊗Bj} include also the observables {Ck ⊗ 1 }.
The classical post-processing of pij can involve either
two-way or one-way classical communication. Two-way
classical communication protocols can tolerate a higher
error rate than one-way communication techniques [5].
On the other hand, one-way post-processing methods
typically allow to derive simpler unconditional security
proofs for QKD than those based on two-way communica-
tion [6, 7, 8, 9]. In this last paradigm, two different cases
can be considered: Reverse reconciliation (RR) refers to
communication from Bob to Alice, and Direct reconcil-
iation (DR) permits only communication from Alice to
Bob. (See, for instance, Refs. [10, 11].)
An essential question in QKD is to determine whether
the correlated data pij allow Alice and Bob to generate
a secret key at all during the second phase of QKD. Here
we consider the so-called trusted device scenario, where
Eve cannot modify the actual detection devices employed
by Alice and Bob, as used in Refs. [12, 13]. We assume
that the legitimate users have complete knowledge about
their detection devices, which are fixed by the actual ex-
periment. The case of two-way classical post-processing
has been analysed in Ref. [13], where it was proven that
a necessary precondition for secure two-way QKD is the
provable presence of quantum correlations in pij
2is, it must be possible to interprete pij , together with the
knowledge of the corresponding observables {Ai⊗Bj}, as
coming exclusively from an entangled state. Otherwise,
no secret key can be distilled from pij . In order to deliver
this entanglement proof any separability criteria (see, for
instance, Ref. [14] and references therein) might be em-
ployed. The important question here is whether the cho-
sen criterion can provide a necessary and sufficient con-
dition to detect entanglement even when the knowledge
about the quantum state is not tomographic complete.
It was proven in Ref. [13] that entanglement witnesses
(EWs) fulfill this condition. An EW is an Hermitian
operator W with a positive expectation value on all sep-
arable states [13, 15, 16, 17]. So, if a state ρAB obeys
Tr(ρABW ) < 0, the state ρAB must be entangled. With
this separability criterion, Refs. [4, 13] analysed three
well-known qubit-based QKD schemes, and provided a
compact description of a minimal verification set of EWs
(i.e, one that does not contain any redundant EW) for
the four-state [18] and the six-state [19] QKD protocols,
and a reduced verification set of EWs (i.e., one which
may still include some redundant EWs) for the two-state
[20] QKD scheme, respectively. These verification sets of
EWs allow a systematic search for quantum correlations
in pij . One negative expectation value of one EW in the
set suffices to detect entanglement. To guarantee that
no verifiable entanglement is present in pij , however, it
is necessary to test all the members of the set. Unfor-
tunately, to find a minimal verification set of EWs, even
for ideal qubit-based QKD schemes, is not always an easy
task, and it seems to require a whole independent analysis
for each protocol, let alone for higher dimensional QKD
schemes [4, 13]. (See also Ref. [21].) Also, one would like
to include in the analysis the attenuation introduced by
the quantum channel, not considered in Refs. [4, 13], and
which represents one of the main limitations for optical
realisations of QKD.
One central observation of this paper is very simple,
yet potentially very useful: Given any qubit-based two-
way QKD scheme, one can search for quantum correla-
tions in pij by just applying the positive partial transpo-
sition (PPT) criterion [15, 22] adapted to the case of a
quantum state that cannot be completely reconstructed.
This criterion provides a necessary and sufficient entan-
glement verification condition for any qubit-based QKD
protocol even in the presence of loss introduced by the
channel, since, in this scenario, only nonpositive partial
transposed (NPT) entangled states exist. Moreover, it is
rather simple to evaluate in general since it can be cast
into the form of a convex optimisation problem known
as semidefinite program (SDP) [23, 24]. Such instances
of convex optimisation problems can be solved efficiently,
for example by means of interior-point methods [23, 24].
This means, in particular, that this criterion can be ap-
plied to any qubit-based QKD scheme in a completely
systematic way.
One-way QKD schemes can be analysed as well with
SDP techniques. It was shown in Ref. [25] that a neces-
sary precondition for one-way QKD with RR (DR) is that
Alice and Bob can prove that there exists no quantum
state having a symmetric extension to two copies of sys-
tem A (system B) that is compatible with the observed
data pij . This kind of states (with symmetric extensions)
have been analysed in detail in Refs. [26, 27, 28], where it
was proven that the search for symmetric extensions for
a given quantum state can be stated as a SDP. (See also
Refs. [29, 30].) Here we complete the results contained
in Ref. [25], now presenting specifically the analysis for
the case of a lossy channel.
Both QKD verification criteria mentioned above, based
on SDP techniques, also provide a means to search for
witness operators for a given two-way or one-way QKD
protocol in a similar spirit as in Refs. [4, 13]. Any SDP
has an associated dual problem that represents also a
SDP [23, 24]. This dual problem can be used to obtain
a certificate of infeasibility whenever the primal problem
is actually infeasible. Most importantly, it can be proven
that the solution to this dual problem corresponds to the
evaluation of an optimal witness operator, that belongs
to the minimal verification set of them for the given pro-
tocol, on the observed data pij . A positive expectation
value of this optimal witness operator indicates that no
secret key can be distilled from the observed data pij .
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. II we in-
troduce the QKD verification criteria for two-way and
one-way QKD in more detail, and we show how to cast
them as primal SDPs. Then, in Sec. III, we present
the dual problems associated to these primal SDPs, and
we show that the solution to these dual problems corre-
sponds to evaluating an optimal witness operator on the
observed data pij for the given protocol. These results
are then illustrated in Sec. IV, where we investigate in
detail the two-state QKD protocol [20] in the presence of
loss. The analysis for other qubit-based QKD schemes
is completely analogous, and we include very briefly the
results of our investigations on other QKD protocols in
an Appendix. Finally, Sec. V concludes the paper with
a summary.
II. QKD VERIFICATION CRITERIA
Our starting point is the observed joint probability dis-
tribution pij obtained by Alice and Bob after their mea-
surements {Ai ⊗ Bj}. This probability distribution de-
fines an equivalence class S of quantum states that are
compatible with it,
S = {ρAB | Tr(Ai ⊗Bj ρAB) = pij , ∀i, j} . (1)
By definition, every ρAB ∈ S can represent the state
shared by Alice and Bob before their measurements.
In single-photon QKD schemes in the presence of loss,
any state ρAB ∈ S can be described on an Hilbert space
HA2 ⊗ HB3 , with HA2 and HB3 denoting, respectively, Al-
ice’s and Bob’s Hilbert spaces, and where the subscript
indicates the dimension of the corresponding Hilbert
3space. To see this, we follow the signal preparation
model introduced previously, where Alice prepares states
|ψsource〉AB =
∑N−1
i=0
√
pi|αi〉A|ψi〉B ∈ HAN ⊗ HB2 , and,
afterwards, she measures the first subsystem in the or-
thogonal basis |αi〉A. Using Neumark’s theorem [31, 32],
we can alternatively describe the preparation process as
Alice producing first bipartite states onHA2 ⊗HB2 and, af-
terwards, she measures the first subsystem with a POVM
{Ai}N−1i=0 . (See also Ref. [33].) To include the loss of a
photon in the quantum channel, we simply enlarge Bob’s
Hilbert space from HB2 to HB3 by adding the vacuum
state |vac〉B.
A. Two-way QKD
Let us now consider two-way QKD protocols. When-
ever the observed joint probability distribution pij , to-
gether with the knowledge of the corresponding measure-
ments performed by Alice and Bob, can be interpreted
as coming from a separable state σsep then no secret key
can be distilled from the observed data [13]. In HA2 ⊗HB3
only NPT entangled states exist and, therefore, a simple
necessary and sufficient criterion to detect entanglement
in this scenario is given by the PPT criterion [15, 22]: A
state ρAB ∈ HA2 ⊗HB3 is separable if and only if its partial
transpose ρΓAB is a positive operator. Partial transpose
means a transpose with respect to one of the subsystems
[34]. Such a result is generally not true in higher dimen-
sions.
Observation 1: Consider a qubit-based QKD scheme in
the presence of loss where Alice and Bob perform local
measurements with POVM elements Ai and Bj , respec-
tively, to obtain the joint probability distribution of the
outcomes pij . Then, the correlations pij can originate
from a separable state if and only if there exists ρAB ∈ S
such as ρΓAB ≥ 0.
Proof. If pij can originate from a separable state, then
there exists σsep such as σsep ∈ S. Moreover, we have
that any separable state satisfies σΓsep ≥ 0. To prove the
other direction, note that if there exists ρAB ∈ S such
that ρΓAB ≥ 0 then, since ρAB ∈ HA2 ⊗HB3 , we find that
ρAB must be separable [15, 22]. 
To determine whether there exists ρAB ∈ S such as
ρΓAB ≥ 0 can be solved by means of a primal semidefinite
program (SDP). This is a convex optimisation problem
of the following form:
minimise cTx (2)
subject to F (x) = F0 +
∑
i
xiFi ≥ 0,
where the vector x = (x1, ..., xt)
T represents the objec-
tive variable, the vector c is fixed by the particular opti-
misation problem, and where the matrices F0 and Fi are
Hermitian matrices. The goal is to minimise the linear
function cTx subjected to the linear matrix inequality
(LMI) constraint F (x) ≥ 0 [23, 24]. If the vector c = 0,
then the optimisation problem given by Eq. (2) reduces
to find whether the LMI constraint can be satisfied for
some value of the vector x or not. In this case, the SDP
is called a feasibility problem. Remarkably, SDPs can be
solved with arbitrary accuracy in polynomial time, for
example by means of interior-point methods [23, 24].
According to Observation 1, we can find whether there
exists a separable state that belongs to the equivalence
class S just by solving the following feasibility problem
[35]:
minimise 0 (3)
subject to ρAB(x) ∈ S,
ρAB(x) ≥ 0,
ρΓAB(x) ≥ 0,
where the objective variable x is used to parametrise the
density operators ρAB. The method used to parametrise
ρAB is discussed in detail in Sec. II C.
B. One-way QKD
One-way RR (DR) QKD schemes require from Alice
and Bob to show that there exists no quantum state
ρAB ∈ S with a symmetric extension to two copies of
system A (system B) [25]. A state ρAB is said to have
a symmetric extension to two copies of system A if and
only if there exists a tripartite state ρABA′ ≥ 0, with
Tr(ρABA′) = 1, and where HA ≃ HA′ , such that [26]:
TrA′(ρABA′) = ρAB, (4)
PρABA′P = ρABA′ , (5)
where the swap operator P satisfies P |ijk〉ABA′ =|kji〉ABA′ . This definition can be easily extended to cover
also the case of symmetric extensions of ρAB to two copies
of system B, and also of extensions of ρAB to more than
two copies of system A or of system B [26].
To find whether ρAB ∈ S has a symmetric extension to
two copies of system A can be solved with the following
feasibility problem:
minimise 0 (6)
subject to ρAB(x) ∈ S,
PρABA′(x)P = ρABA′(x),
TrA′ [ρABA′(x)] = ρAB(x),
ρABA′(x) ≥ 0.
Note that this SDP does not include the constraint
ρAB(x) ≥ 0 because non-negativity of the extension
ρABA′(x), together with the condition TrA′ [ρABA′(x)] =
ρAB(x), already implies non-negativity of ρAB(x). The
SDP for one-way QKD with DR can be obtained in a
similar way.
4C. Parametrisation of the SDPs
To actually implement the SDPs given by Eq. (3) and
Eq. (6), one can parametrise ρAB and ρABA′ such that
some constraints are automatically fulfilled.
In particular, one can choose an operator basis of Her-
mitian matrices {σ0, . . . , σd2−1} for each Hilbert space
Hd. These matrices σi can be taken such as they sat-
isfy the following two conditions: Tr(σi) = d δ0i, and
Tr(σiσj) = d δij . In the case of qubit systems, the Pauli
matrices {σ0, σx, σy, σz} can be selected, where the ma-
trix σ0 denotes the identity operator 1 . For systems on
H3, we can use the Gell-Mann operators, that we shall
denote as {σi}8i=0. With this representation, a general
state ρAB ∈ HA2 ⊗HB3 can be written as
ρAB =
1
6
∑
k={0,x,y,z}
l=0,...,8
xklSkl, (7)
where the operators Skl = σ
A
k ⊗ σBl , the coefficients xkl
are given by xkl = Tr(SklρAB), and x00 = Tr(ρAB) = 1
because of normalisation. Eq. (7) allows us to describe
any bipartite density operator in terms of a fixed number
of real parameters xkl.
The knowledge of Alice and Bob’s POVMs {Ai} and
{Bj}, respectively, together with the observed probabil-
ity distribution pij , determines the equivalence class of
compatible states S. Each POVM element Ai and Bj
can also be expanded in the appropriate operator basis
as Ai =
∑
k={0,x,y,z} aikσ
A
k , and Bj =
∑
l=0,...,8 bjlσ
B
l ,
for some coefficients aik and bjl, respectively. According
to Eq. (1), to guarantee that ρAB ∈ S [first constraint
in Eq. (3) and in Eq. (6)], we obtain that the coefficients
xkl must satisfy the following conditions,∑
kl
aikbjlxkl = pij ∀i, j. (8)
That is, some coefficients xkl are fixed by the known pa-
rameters aik, bjl, and pij . Any operator ρAB ∈ S can
then always be written in the following way,
ρAB(x) = ρfix +
∑
kl 6∈I
xklSkl, (9)
where ρfix corresponds to the part of ρAB(x) that is com-
pletely determined by the parameters aik, bjl, and pij . It
can be expressed as [36]
ρfix =
∑
kl∈I
xklSkl, (10)
where I denotes a multi-index set labeling those combi-
nations of the indexes k = {0, x, y, z} and l = {0, ..., 8}
such that xkl is fixed by Eq. (8). (See also Ref. [37].)
With this representation for ρAB(x), the SDP given by
Eq. (3) can now be written as [35]
minimise 0 (11)
subject to ρAB(x)⊕ ρΓAB(x) ≥ 0,
where the symbol ⊕ denotes direct sum. Let us com-
pare the second part of Eq. (2) with the second part of
Eq. (11). The objective variables xi are now given by
the coefficients xkl of ρAB(x), with kl 6∈ I, the matrix
F0 is given by ρfix ⊕ ρΓfix, and the matrices Fi are those
operators Skl ⊕ SΓkl with kl 6∈ I.
In the SDP given by Eq. (6) we need to parametrise as
well the quantum state ρABA′ . The second constraint in
Eq. (6) imposes that ρABA′ must remain invariant under
permutation of systems A and A′. This can be done with
the following parametrisation [26, 27, 28]:
ρABA′ =
1
12
∑
l
k>m
fklm (σ
A
k ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
m (12)
+ σAm ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
k ) +
∑
kl
fklk σ
A
k ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
k ,
with k,m = {0, x, y, z} and l = 0, . . . , 8.
To guarantee that TrA′(ρABA′) = ρAB [third con-
straint in Eq. (6)], the state coefficients of ρAB and ρABA′
need to fulfill the following conditions,
fkl0 = xkl ∀k, l. (13)
That is, some of the state parameters of ρABA′ are al-
ready fixed by the coefficients of ρAB.
To simplify the notation used later on, we shall collect
the objective variables of the SDP given by Eq. (6) within
two different groups of them: The vector x contains those
coefficients xkl of ρAB not fixed by Eq. (8), and the vec-
tor y contains those coefficients fklm of ρABA′ not fixed
by Eq. (13). With this parametrisation, the first three
constraints in Eq. (6) are fulfilled automatically and the
SDP given by Eq. (6) can be reduced to solve the follow-
ing one
minimise 0 (14)
subject to ρABA′(x,y) ≥ 0.
III. WITNESS OPERATORS FOR TWO-WAY
AND ONE-WAY QKD
In this section we show how to rephrase the QKD veri-
fication criteria introduced in the previous section into a
search for appropriate witness operators. In order to do
this, we use the dual problems associated with the pri-
mal SDPs given by Eq. (11) and Eq. (14), respectively.
In particular, we prove that the solutions to these dual
problems correspond to the evaluation of an optimal wit-
ness operator, that belongs to the minimal verification
set of them for the given two-way or one-way QKD pro-
tocol, on the observed data pij . A positive expectation
value of this optimal witness operator states that no se-
cret key can be distilled from the observed data pij . This
approach has already been considered for the symmetric
extension case in Ref. [27], and also for a slightly dif-
ferent scenario in Ref. [38]. Our main motivation here
5is to show specifically that this relationship still holds
even if we restrict ourselves to partial information about
the quantum state. A detailed discussion on some dual-
ity properties that guarantee that the solution to these
dual problems can actually be associated with a witness
operator is included in Appendix A.
Let us first introduce the dual problem associated to
the primal SDP given by Eq. (2). It has the following
form [23, 24]:
maximise −Tr(F0Z) (15)
subject to Z ≥ 0
Tr(FiZ) = ci ∀i,
where the Hermitian matrix Z is now the objective vari-
able. This matrix is positive semidefinite Z ≥ 0 and
is subjected to several linear constraints of the form
Tr(ZFi) = ci ∀i.
A. Two-way QKD
In this section we show that the solution to the dual
problem associated with the SDP given by Eq. (11) cor-
responds to the evaluation of an optimal decomposable
EWs (DEWs) [17, 39] on the observed data pij . (See
also Ref. [40].) An EW W is called decomposable if and
only if there exist two positive operators P,Q ≥ 0, and a
real parameter ǫ ∈ [0, 1], such that W = ǫP + (1 − ǫ)QΓ
[17, 39]. In HA2 ⊗ HB3 all EWs are DEWs. In what fol-
lows, we establish this connection explicitly via the dual
problem.
The SDP given by Eq. (11) can be transformed into
a slightly different, but completely equivalent, form as
follows (see Appendix A),
minimise t (16)
subject to ρAB(x)⊕ ρΓAB(x) + t1 ≥ 0,
where t denotes an auxiliary objective variable. Accord-
ing to Eq. (15), the dual problem associated with Eq. (16)
can be written as
maximise −Tr[(ρfix ⊕ ρΓfix)Z]
subject to Z ≥ 0
Tr(Z) = 1
Tr[(Skl ⊕ SΓkl)Z] = 0 ∀kl 6∈ I. (17)
The structure of all the matrices which appear in this
dual problem is the direct sum of two different matrices.
Then, without loss of generality, we can assume that the
same block structure is satisfied for Z, i.e., Z = Z1⊕Z2.
This means, in particular, that the objective function in
Eq. (17) can now be re-expressed as
Tr[(ρfix ⊕ ρΓfix)(Z1 ⊕ Z2)] = Tr[(Z1 + ZΓ2 )ρfix]
≡ Tr(Wρfix), (18)
where we have used the property Tr(Z2ρ
Γ
fix) = Tr(Z
Γ
2 ρfix)
and, in the last equality, we defined the operator W ≡
Z1+Z
Γ
2 . Next we show thatW is a DEWs. For that, note
that the semidefinite constraintZ ≥ 0 implies Z1, Z2 ≥ 0.
Moreover, the witness is normalised, since Tr(Z) = 1
implies Tr(W ) = Tr(Z1 + Z
Γ
2 ) = 1.
To conclude, we use the remaining equality constraints,
Tr[(Skl ⊕ SΓkl)Z] = 0 ∀kl 6∈ I, to show that to evaluate
the expectation value of W one only needs to consider
ρfix. That is, W belongs to the minimal verification set
of EWs for the given QKD protocol, and its expectation
value can be obtained from the observed data pij only [4].
Using the ansatz Z1 =
∑
kl z
1
klSkl, and Z
Γ
2 =
∑
kl z
2
klSkl,
the equality constraints impose z1kl + z
2
kl = 0 ∀kl 6∈ I.
Hence, the DEW W has the following structure
W =
∑
kl∈I
(z1kl + z
2
kl)Skl ≡
∑
kl∈I
wklSkl, (19)
with wkl = z
1
kl + z
2
kl. Combining Eq. (9) and Eq. (19),
we obtain Tr[WρAB(x)] = Tr(Wρfix) =
∑
kl∈I wklxkl.
Whenever the solution to the dual problem given by
Eq. (17) delivers Tr[(ρfix ⊕ ρΓfix)Z] ≡ Tr(Wρfix) ≥ 0 then
no secret key can be distilled from the observed data pij
with two-way classical communication. To see this, note
that, by definition, Eq. (17) guarantees that there exists
no other DEW W ′, that belongs to a verification set of
them for the given QKD protocol, such that Tr(W ′ρfix) <
Tr(Wρfix).
B. One-way QKD
In this part we use the dual problem associated with
the SDP given by Eq. (14) to show that its solution corre-
sponds to the evaluation of an optimal witness operator
for the case of states with symmetric extensions. We
shall follow the method introduced in Ref. [27], but now
we will consider specifically the case of partial knowledge
about the quantum state. (See also Ref. [40].)
Like in the previous section, the feasibility problem
given by Eq. (14) can be transformed as follows (see Ap-
pendix A),
minimise t (20)
subject to ρABA′(x,y) + t1 /dA ≥ 0,
with dA = dim(HA), e.g., in our case dA = 2. The
inclusion of the factor dA in Eq. (20) does not alter its
result and, as we will see at the end of this section, it
gives the correct normalisation for the witnesses.
For convenience, we will express the state ρABA′(x,y)
in terms of a map Λ : HAdA ⊗ HBdB → HAdA ⊗ HBdB ⊗
HA′dA that takes an arbitrary Hermitian operator A =
1/(dAdB)
∑
kl aklSkl ∈ HAdA⊗HBdB , with dB = dim(HB),
6to the Hermitian operator
Λ(A) =
1
d2AdB
[ ∑
l={0,...,d2
B
−1}
k={1,...,d2
A
−1}
akl (σ
A
k ⊗ σBl ⊗ 1A
′
+ 1A ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
k )
+
∑
l={0,...,d2
B
−1}
a0l 1
A ⊗ σBl ⊗ 1A
′
]
, (21)
Let ρfix be again the part of ρAB ∈ S that is fixed
by the parameters aik, bjl, and pij . Without loss of
generality, we consider the following structure for ρfix:
ρfix = 1/(dAdB)
∑
kl∈I xklSkl, where the multi-index I
has the same meaning as before, i.e., it labels those
combinations of the indexes k = {0, ..., d2A − 1} and
l = {0, ..., d2B − 1} such that xkl is fixed by Eq. (8).
Using Eq. (21), we can rewrite ρABA′(x,y) in the fol-
lowing compact way,
ρABA′(x,y) = Λ(ρfix) +
∑
kl 6∈I
xkl Λ(Skl)
+
∑
J
yJ GJ , (22)
where the Hermitian matrices GJ can be grouped into
two different sets,
Gklk = σ
A
k ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
k ∀l, ∀k ≥ 1 (23)
Gmlk = σ
A
m ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
k
+ σAk ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
m ∀l, ∀k > m ≥ 1,
and where the multi-index J is used to label both differ-
ent combinations of the indices k, l, and m.
The dual problem associated with Eq. (20) can now be
written as
maximise −Tr[ZΛ(ρfix)] (24)
subject to Z ≥ 0
Tr(Z) = dA
Tr[ZΛ(Skl)] = 0 ∀kl 6∈ I
Tr(ZGJ ) = 0 ∀J.
Next we search for the most general form of a possible
solution Z for this dual problem. It will enable us to
extract the most compact form of a witness operator for
the symmetric extendibility problem.
All the linear constraints on the operator Z contained
in Eq. (24), as well as the objective function itself, are
invariant under the swap operator P , which exchanges
the first and the third subsystem. Moreover, the positive
semidefinite constraint Z¯ = PZP ≥ 0 is also satisfied
since P is a unitary operator, i.e., P 2 = 1 . This means
that, if Z is a solution for the dual problem, the opera-
tor Z¯ is also a possible solution for it, since it fulfills all
the constraints and it gives exactly the same expectation
value. Following a similar argumentation, also the equal
mixture of Z and Z¯, i.e., Z˜ = 1/2(Z + Z¯), is as well a
possible solution. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we can consider that Z is invariant under the swap oper-
ator P . Under this assumption, it turns out that Z can
be decomposed as follows
Z =
1
d2AdB
[ ∑
l
k>m
zmlk (σ
A
m ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
k (25)
+ σAk ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
m ) +
∑
kl
zklk σ
A
k ⊗Bl ⊗σA
′
k
]
.
Let us now analyse in more detail the linear constraints
on Z given in Eq. (20). Each linear constraint cancels
one of the coefficients zmlk. For instance, the constraint
Tr(ZGiji) imposes ziji = 0. Then, we can remove all
these linear constraints, except the normalisation condi-
tion Tr(Z) = dA, by just making the proper coefficients
zmlk in Eq. (25) equal to zero. This way we arrive at the
following form for the variable Z, which we shall denote
by Z∗,
Z∗ =
1
d2AdB
[ ∑
l;k≥1
kl∈I
zkl1(σ
A
k ⊗ σBl ⊗ 1A
′
(26)
+ 1A ⊗ σBl ⊗ σA
′
k ) +
∑
l
0l∈I
z0l0 1
A ⊗ σBl ⊗ 1A
′
]
.
That is, if we assume the form Z∗ for the variable Z
in the dual problem given by Eq. (24), then the linear
constraints are fulfilled automatically. Substituting the
variable Z with Z∗ in Eq. (24) we obtain the following
shorter form for the dual problem,
maximise −Tr[Z∗Λ(ρfix)] (27)
subject to Z∗ ≥ 0
Tr(Z∗) = dA.
Now, in order to extract a witness operator from the
Hermitian operator Z∗, we follow the method proposed
in Ref. [27]. In particular, every map Λ : HAdA ⊗HBdB →
HAdA ⊗ HBdB ⊗ HA
′
dA
has associated an adjoint map Λ† :
HAdA⊗HBdB⊗HA
′
dA
→ HAdA⊗HBdB defined as Tr[U Λ(V )] =
Tr[Λ†(U) V ] for any Hermitian operators V ∈ HAdA⊗HBdB ,
and U ∈ HAdA ⊗HBdB ⊗HA
′
dA
. With this definition, we can
rewrite the objective function in Eq. (27) as
Tr[Z∗Λ(ρfix)] = Tr[Λ
†(Z∗)ρfix] ≡ Tr(Wsymρfix), (28)
where we defined Wsym ≡ Λ†(Z∗) as the desired wit-
ness operator for the symmetric extendibility problem.
In the remaining part of this section, we obtain the gen-
eral structure of the witness operatorWsym. For that, we
simply apply the adjoint map Λ† to the operator Z∗, set
the resulting operator equal to an operator of arbitrary
7form W ∗, solve the equality constraint, and, finally, for-
mulate the dual problem in terms of this new operator
W ∗.
The map Λ† can be written as [27],
Λ†(Z) =
1
dA
[
TrA′(Z)+TrA′(PZP )− 1
dA
1A⊗TrAA′(Z)
]
.
(29)
Setting Λ†(Z∗) equal to an arbitrary Hermitian opera-
tor W ∗ = 1/(dAdB)
∑
kl wklSkl we obtain the following
equality constraint
∑
kl
wklSkl =
∑
l;k≥1
kl∈I
2zkl0
dA
Skl +
∑
l
0l∈I
z0l0 S0l. (30)
Since we have expressed every operator in terms of an
operator basis, the equality constraint can only be ful-
filled if the coefficients zklm of Z
∗, and the coefficients
wkl of W
∗, are related via:
wkl = 2zkl0/dA ∀l, ∀k ≥ 1, kl ∈ I, (31)
w0l = z0l0/dA ∀l, 0l ∈ I,
wkl = 0 kl 6∈ I.
Now, instead of considering the matrix Z∗ as the objec-
tive variable of the dual problem, we can equivalently
consider the matrix W ∗ as the free variable. In order to
do so, we only need to translate the positive semidefi-
nite constraint Z∗ ≥ 0 together with the normalisation
condition Tr(Z∗) = dA included in Eq. (27) into new
constraints on W ∗. This can be done by using Eq. (31).
This way, we arrive at the following form for the dual
problem:
maximise −Tr(W ∗ρfix) (32)
subject to W ∗ ⊗ 1A′ + P (W ∗ ⊗ 1A′)P ≥ 0
Tr(W ∗) = 1,
where the variable W ∗ represents a witness operator for
the symmetric extendibility problem. Moreover, from
Eq. (31) we obtain that W ∗ can always be expressed as
W ∗ =
1
dAdB
∑
kl∈I
wklSkl. (33)
That is,W ∗ belongs to the minimal verification set of wit-
nesses for the given one-way (RR) QKD protocol. Like
in the previous section, whenever the solution to the dual
problem given by Eq. (32) delivers Tr(W ∗ρfix) ≥ 0 then
no secret key can be distilled from the observed data pij
with one-way RR. The case of one-way QKD with DR
can be analysed in a similar way.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section we study the two-state QKD protocol
[20], both for the case of two-way and one-way classi-
cal communication. The analysis for other qubit-based
QKD schemes is completely analogous, and we include
very briefly the results of our investigations on other well-
known QKD protocols in Appendix B. We refer here to
single-photon implementations of the qubit. The state
of the qubit is described, for instance, by some degree
of freedom in the polarisation of the photon. In our cal-
culations we follow the approach introduced in Sec. II,
although similar results could also be obtained using the
witness approach presented in Sec. III. The numeri-
cal evaluations are performed with the freely-available
SDP solver SDPT3-3.02 [41], together with the input tool
YALMIP [42].
We shall consider that the observed joint probability
distribution pij originates from Alice and Bob measuring
the following quantum state
ρAB = (1− p)
[
(1− e)1A ⊗ UB(θ)|ψ〉AB〈ψ|1A ⊗ UB†(θ)
+
e
2
ρA ⊗ 1˜B
]
+ pρA ⊗ |vac〉B〈vac|, (34)
where p ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that Bob receives
the vacuum state |vac〉B, e ∈ [0, 1] represents an error pa-
rameter (or depolarising rate) of the channel, 1A is the
identity operator on Alice’s Hilbert space, UB(θ) repre-
sents a unitary operator acting on Bob’s system, |ψ〉AB
denotes the effective bipartite state initially prepared by
Alice in the given QKD protocol, ρA represents Alice’s
reduced density matrix (i.e., ρA = TrB(|ψ〉AB〈ψ|)), and
the operator 1˜
B
is given by 1˜
B
= 1B − |vac〉B〈vac|.
The quantum state given by Eq. (34) defines one pos-
sible eavesdropping interaction. But our analysis can
straightforwardly be applied to other quantum channels,
as it depends only on the probability distribution pij
that characterises the results of Alice’s and Bob’s mea-
surements. We include the operator UB(θ) in Eq. (34)
to model the collective noise (or correlated noise) in-
troduced by the quantum channel (e.g., optical fiber)
[43, 44]. This noise arises from the fluctuation of the
birefringence of the optical fiber which alters the polar-
isation state of the photons. When this fluctuation is
slow in time, its effect can be described with a unitary
operation [43, 44]. For simplicity, we shall consider that
UB(θ) is parametrised only with one real parameter θ. In
particular, we choose UB(θ) = cos θ|0〉〈0| − sin θ|0〉〈1| +
sin θ|1〉〈0| + cos θ|1〉〈1| + |vac〉〈vac| with θ ∈ [0, π/4]. If
θ = 0 no collective noise is present and Eq. (34) describes
a depolarising channel with loss.
In order to illustrate our results, we calculate an upper
bound on the tolerable depolarising rate e as a function of
the photon loss probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for sim-
plicity, we take only two different values of the angle θ.
For instance, we choose θ = 0 and θ = π/8. These three
parameters, e, p, and θ, allow us to evaluate the perfor-
mance of a QKD protocol when the quantum channel is
described by Eq. (34). One could also select other fig-
ures of merit in order to evaluate a protocol, such as the
quantum bit error rate (QBER). This is the rate of events
8where Alice and Bob obtain different results. It refers to
the sifted key, i.e, it considers only those events where
the signal preparation and detection methods employ the
same polarisation basis. We include as well an analytic
expression for the QBER for the given QKD protocol.
A. Two-state protocol
The two-state protocol [20] is one of the simplest QKD
protocols. It is based on the random transmission of only
two nonorthogonal states, |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉. Alice chooses,
at random and independently every time, a bit value i,
and prepares a qubit in the state |ϕi〉 = α|0〉+(−1)iβ|1〉,
with 0 < α < 1/
√
2 and β =
√
1− α2, that is sent it
to Bob. On the receiving side, Bob measures the qubit
he receives in a basis chosen at random within the set
{{|ϕ0〉, |ϕ⊥0 〉}, {|ϕ1〉, |ϕ⊥1 〉}}, with |〈ϕi|ϕ⊥i 〉| = 0. The
loss of a photon corresponds to a projection onto the
vacuum state |vac〉. Bob could also employ a different
detection method defined by a POVM with the follow-
ing operators: Bj = 1/(2β
2)|ϕ⊥1−j〉〈ϕ⊥1−j | with j = 0, 1,
Bnull = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| −
∑
j Bj , and Bvac = |vac〉〈vac|.
In this last case, Alice’s bit value i is associated with
the operator Bi, while the operator Bnull represents an
inconclusive result. This is the approach that we shall
consider here.
The preparation process can be thought of as Al-
ice prepares first the bipartite signal state |ψ〉AB =
1/
√
2(|0〉A|ϕ0〉B+ |1〉A|ϕ1〉B), and then she measures her
first subsystem with the POVM operators Ai = |i〉〈i|
with i = 0, 1. The fact that the reduced density matrix
of Alice is fixed and cannot be modified by Eve is vital
to guarantee the security of this scheme. Otherwise, the
joint probability distribution pij alone does not allow Al-
ice and Bob to distinguish between the entangled state
|ψ〉AB and the separable one σAB = 1/2
∑1
i=0 |i〉A〈i| ⊗
|ϕi〉B〈ϕi| [4, 13]. We need to add then to the observables
given above also the operators σx ⊗ σ0 and σy ⊗ σ0 such
as Alice has complete tomographic knowledge of ρA.
Following the approach introduced in Sec. II, in Fig. 1
we present an upper bound on the tolerable depolarising
rate e as a function of the photon loss probability p for
two different values of the parameter α. It states that no
secret key can be distilled from the correlations estab-
lished by the users. In this example, the results obtained
coincide when θ = 0 and θ = π/8. To obtain an upper
bound on the tolerable QBER one can use the following
expression
QBER =
2 sin2 θ + (1− 2 sin2 θ)e
2{2β2 + (α2 − β2)[γ + (1 − γ)e]} , (35)
with γ = 2(α2 sin2 θ + β2 cos2 θ). In particular, for given
values of the parameters α, β, and θ, one only needs to
substitute in Eq. (35) the value of e given in Fig. 1 as a
function of the parameter p.
Remarkably, the cut-off point for two-way QKD pre-
sented in Fig. 1, i.e., the value of the photon loss proba-
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FIG. 1: Upper bound on the depolarising rate e as a function
of the photon loss probability p for the two-state QKD proto-
col. The equivalence class of states S is fixed by the observed
data pij , which are generated via measurements onto the state
given by Eq. (34). Two-way classical post-processing is illus-
trated with a solid line. One-way classical post-processing is
represented with a dashed line for RR, and with a dotted line
for DR. The cases θ = 0 and θ = pi/8 provide the same re-
sults. It states that no secret key can be obtained from the
correlations established by the users.
bility p that makes e = 0 and also QBER = 0, coincides
with the limit imposed by the unambiguous state dis-
crimination attack [45, 46, 47, 48, 49]. In the two-state
protocol this limit is given by p = 1 − 2α2. (See also
Ref. [50].) Fig. 1 also shows a difference between one-
way classical post-processing with RR and with DR as
a function of the parameter p. The reason behind this
effect is beyond the scope of this paper and needs further
investigations.
V. CONCLUSION
A fundamental question in quantum key distribution
(QKD) is to determine whether the legitimate users of
the system can use their available measurement results
to generate a secret key via two-way or one-way clas-
9sical post-processing of the observed data. In this pa-
per we have investigated single-photon QKD protocols
in the presence of loss introduced by the quantum chan-
nel. Our results are based on a simple precondition for
secure QKD for two-way and one-way classical communi-
cation. In particular, the legitimate users need to prove
that there exists no separable state (in the case of two-
way QKD), or that there exists no quantum state having
a symmetric extension (one-way QKD), that is compati-
ble with the available measurements results.
We have shown that both criteria can be formulated
as a convex optimisation problem known as a primal
semidefinite program (SDP). Such instances of convex
optimisation problems can be solved efficiently, for exam-
ple by means of interior-point methods. Moreover, these
SDP techniques allow us to evaluate these criteria for any
single-photon QKD protocol in a completely systematic
way. A similar approach was already used in Ref. [25] for
the case of one-way QKD without losses. Here we com-
plete these results, now presenting specifically the analy-
sis for the case of a lossy channel. Furthermore, we have
shown that these QKD verification criteria based on SDP
provide also a means to search for witness operators for a
given two-way or one-way QKD protocol. Any SDP has
an associated dual problem that represents also a SDP.
We have demonstrated that the solution to the this dual
problem corresponds to the evaluation of an optimal wit-
ness operator that belongs to the minimal verification set
of them for the given two-way (or one-way) QKD proto-
col. Most importantly, a positive expectation value of
this optimal witness operator guarantees that no secret
key can be distilled from the available measurements re-
sults. Finally, we have illustrated our results by analysing
the performance of several well-known qubit-based QKD
protocols for a given channel model.
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APPENDIX A: SOME DUALITY PROPERTIES
In this Appendix we present some duality properties of
a general SDP [23, 24] that guarantee that the solution to
the dual problems introduced in Sec. III can be associated
with a witness operator.
The primal problem given by Eq. (2) is called feasi-
ble (strictly feasible) if there exists x such as F (x) ≥ 0
(F (x) > 0). Similarly, the dual problem given by Eq. (15)
is called feasible (strictly feasible) if there exists a matrix
Z ≥ 0 (Z > 0) which fulfills all the desired constraints.
The weak duality condition, illustrated in Eq. (A1), al-
lows to derive simple upper and lower bounds for the
solution of either the primal or dual problem. In partic-
ular, for every feasible solution x of the primal problem
and for every feasible solution Z of the dual problem, the
following relation holds:
cTx+Tr(ZF0) = Tr(ZF (x)) ≥ 0. (A1)
The strong duality condition certifies whether the op-
timal solution to the primal and dual problem, that we
shall denote as p∗ and d∗, respectively, are equal. More
precisely, p∗ = d∗ if (1) The primal problem is strictly fea-
sible, or (2) The dual problem is strictly feasible. More-
over, if both conditions are satisfied simultaneously then
it is guaranteed that there is a feasible pair (xopt, Zopt)
achieving the optimal values p∗ = d∗. This last condition
is known as the complementary slackness condition.
The SDP given by Eq. (2), when c = 0, can always be
transformed as follows [23, 24]
minimise t (A2)
subject to F (x, t) = F (x) + t1 ≥ 0.
This SDP is always strictly feasible. To see this, note that
if x = 0 and t > |mini λi(F0)|, where λi(F0) denote the
eigenvalues of the matrix F0, then F (x, t) > 0. Moreover,
it can be shown that Eq. (A2) is equivalent to the original
SDP. Let t∗ be the solution to Eq. (A2). If t∗ > 0, the
original problem is infeasible since F (x) 6≥ 0 ∀ x. On the
other hand, if t∗ ≤ 0 there exists x¯ such that F (x¯) ≥ 0,
stating that the original problem is feasible. That is, the
solution t∗ of the SDP given by Eq. (A2) certifies whether
the original problem is indeed feasible or not.
The dual problem associated with Eq. (A2) is given
by:
maximise −Tr(F0Z) (A3)
subject to Z ≥ 0
Tr(FiZ) = 0 ∀i,
Tr(Z) = 1.
If all the matrices Fi are traceless, i.e., Tr(Fi) = 0, this
dual problem is also always strictly feasible. A trivial
strictly feasible solution to this problem is given by Z =
1 /d > 0, where d denotes the dimension of Fi.
If we apply the three duality conditions mentioned
above to the SDPs given by Eq. (A2) and Eq. (A3)
we find that, if Eq. (A2) delivers an infeasible solution
t∗ > 0,
Tr(F0Zopt) = −d∗ = −t∗ < 0. (A4)
This arises from the fact that the strong duality relation
guarantees that d∗ = t∗, and the complementary slack-
ness condition certifies that there is a Zopt that achieves
10
the optimal value d∗. When t∗ ≤ 0 the weak duality
condition assures that
Tr(F0Z) ≥ −t∗ ≥ 0 (A5)
for every feasible solution Z of the dual problem. Both
results together show that the solution to the dual prob-
lem given by Eq. (A3) can be associated to a witness
operator W . In particular, the ability of W to detect, at
least, one state, i.e., ∃ ρ such as Tr(Wρ) < 0, can be re-
lated with Eq. (A4). On the other hand, the requirement
that W is positive on all states belonging to a given set
of them can be related with Eq. (A5). To achieve the
desired equivalence, however, the dual problem must be
strictly feasible, otherwise the complementary slackness
condition does not hold and the existence of an appro-
priate witness is not guaranteed. It turns out that all
the linear constraints included in the dual problems con-
sidered in Sec. III have traceless matrices Fi, such that
these dual problems are always strictly feasible.
APPENDIX B: MORE QUBIT-BASED QKD
SCHEMES
In this Appendix we include very briefly the results of
our investigations on other well-known qubit-based QKD
protocols. Like in Sec. IV, we shall consider that the
observed data pij are generated via measurements onto
the state given by Eq. (34).
1. Six-state protocol
In this scheme, Alice prepares a qubit in one of the
following six quantum states: {|0〉, |1〉, |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ±
|1〉), |±˜〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± i|1〉), and sends it to Bob [19].
On the receiving side, Bob measures each incoming sig-
nal by projecting it onto one of the three possible bases.
The loss of a photon in the channel is characterised by a
projection onto the vacuum state |vac〉.
The resulting upper bound on the tolerable depolar-
ising rate e is illustrated in Fig. 2. The QBER is given
by
QBER =
1
6
[
4 sin2 θ + (3− 4 sin2 θ)e
]
. (B1)
For θ = 0 we find, as expected, that whenever QBER ≥
33% (corresponding to a value of e = 0.66) no secret
key can be distilled by two-way classical post-processing
[19, 58]. In the case of one-way classical post-processing
(both for RR and DR), and assuming θ = 0 and p = 0,
we obtain that secure QKD might only be possible for
a QBER < 1/6 (e = 0.33). A possible eavesdropping
strategy to attain this cut-off point is, for instance, to
use an universal cloning machine to clone every signal
sent by Alice such as the fidelities of Eve’s and Bob’s
clones coincide [59]. (See also Ref. [25].)
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FIG. 2: Upper bound on the depolarising rate e as a function
of the photon loss probability p for the six-state QKD pro-
tocol. Two-way classical post-processing is illustrated with
a solid line, while one-way classical post-processing is repre-
sented with a dashed line for RR, and with a dotted line for
DR. The cases θ = 0 and θ = pi/8 provide the same results in
this case.
2. Four-state protocol
The four-state protocol [18] is similar to the six-state
protocol, but now Alice sends one of four possible signal
states instead of one of six. In particular, she chooses
one state within the set {|0〉, |1〉, |±〉} and sends it Bob.
Each received signal is projected by Bob onto one of the
two possible bases, together with a projection onto the
vacuum state |vac〉 corresponding to the loss of a photon.
The resulting upper bound on the depolarising rate e
is illustrated in Fig. 3. The QBER is now given by
QBER = sin2 θ +
(1− 2 sin2 θ)e
2
. (B2)
If θ = 0 we obtain the well-known result stating that
whenever QBER ≥ 25% (corresponding to a value of e =
0.5) no secret key can be distilled by two-way classical
post-processing [58]. Similarly, for the case of one-way
classical post-processing, and assuming θ = 0 and p =
0, we find that the QBER must be lower than 14, 6%
(e = 0.292). This last result coincides with the value of
the QBER produced by an eavesdropping strategy where
Eve and Bob Shannon information are equal [60, 61].
3. Qubit-based four-plus-two-state protocol
This scheme can be seen as a combination of two
two-state QKD protocols [51, 62]. More precisely, Al-
ice selects, at random and independently each time,
one of the following four signal states, {|ϕk〉 = α|0〉 +
(−1)kβ|1〉, |ϕk¯〉 = α|0〉 + i(−1)kβ|1〉} with k = 0, 1, and
sends it to Bob. On the receiving side, Bob measures
11
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FIG. 3: Upper bound on the depolarising rate e as a function
of the photon loss probability p for the four-state QKD pro-
tocol. Two-way classical post-processing is illustrated with
a solid line, while one-way classical post-processing is repre-
sented with a dashed line for RR, and with a dotted line for
DR. The cases θ = 0 and θ = pi/8 provide the same results in
this case. This upper bound also coincides for the case of the
trine protocol and for the QKD scheme proposed in Ref. [57]
when θ = 0.
each incoming signal by choosing, at random and inde-
pendently for each signal, one of two possible POVMs.
Each POVM corresponds to the one used in the two-state
protocol (see Sec. IVA) for the signal states |ϕk〉 = α|0〉+
(−1)kβ|1〉, with k = 0, 1, and |ϕk¯〉 = α|0〉 + i(−1)kβ|1〉,
with k = 0, 1, respectively.
The resulting upper bound on the depolarising rate e
is illustrated in Fig. 4 for the cases α = 0.2 and α = 0.4.
The QBER is given by
QBER =
e+ (1− e)[1 + (α2 − β2)2] sin2 θ
2
[
e+ (1 − e)[2(α4 + β4) sin2 θ + 4α2β2 cos2 θ]] .
(B3)
In the case of two-way classical post-processing, the max-
imum tolerable value of e shown in Fig. 4 starts decreas-
ing as the losses in the channel increase, and, at some
point, it becomes constant independently of p. Interest-
ingly, the value of p where this inflexion occurs, corre-
sponds to the point where Eve can discriminate unam-
biguously between the two states in the set {|ϕk〉}, with
k = 0, 1, or between those states in the set {|ϕk¯〉}, with
k = 0, 1. This happens when p = 1− 2α2.
4. Three-state protocol
This QKD scheme requires Alice sending to Bob one
of the following three quantum states |0〉, |1〉, and |+〉
[52, 53, 54, 55]. On the receiving side, Bob projects each
incoming signal onto one of the two possible bases used
in the four-state protocol (see Sec. B 2), together with a
projection onto the vacuum state |vac〉.
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FIG. 4: Upper bound on the depolarising rate e as a function
of the photon loss probability p for the qubit-based four-plus-
two-state QKD protocol. Two-way classical post-processing
is illustrated with a solid line, while one-way classical post-
processing is represented with a dashed line for RR, and with
a dotted line for DR. The cases θ = 0 and θ = pi/8 provide
the same results.
The resulting upper bound on the depolarising rate e
is illustrated in Fig. 5. The QBER has now the following
form
QBER =
1
2
[
1 + (1− e)(sin2 θ − cos2 θ)
]
. (B4)
For the quantum channel given by Eq. (34), and assum-
ing θ = 0 or θ = π/8, the maximum value of e toler-
ated by the three-state protocol coincides with the four-
state protocol for the cases of two-way and one-way post-
processing with DR.
5. Trine protocol
In the trine protocol [56], Alice selects, at random and
independently each time, a qubit in one of the following
three states: |0〉, 1/2|0〉+√3/2|1〉, and 1/2|0〉−√3/2|1〉,
and sends it to Bob. Each received signal is measured
12
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
D
ep
ol
ar
izi
ng
 P
ar
am
et
er
 e
Photon Loss Probability p
Three State Protocol
Two-way
One-way RR
One-way DR
FIG. 5: Upper bound on the depolarising rate e as a function
of the photon loss probability p for the three-state QKD pro-
tocol. Two-way classical post-processing is illustrated with
a solid line, while one-way classical post-processing is repre-
sented with a dashed line for RR, and with a dotted line for
DR. The cases θ = 0 and θ = pi/8 provide the same results.
by Bob with a POVM defined by the following opera-
tors: B0 = 2/3|1〉〈1|, Bi = 2/3|ψi〉〈ψi|, with i = 1, 2,
and where |ψi〉 =
√
3/2|0〉 + (−1)i1/2|1〉, and Bvac =
|vac〉〈vac|.
For the quantum channel given by Eq. (34), and as-
suming θ = 0 or θ = π/8, it turns out that the maximum
value of e tolerated by this scheme, both for two-way
and one-way post-processing, coincides with the four-
state protocol (see Fig. 3). The QBER, however, is given
by
QBER =
2e+ 4(1− e) sin2 θ
3 + e+ 2(1− e) sin2 θ . (B5)
6. Ac´ın-Massar-Pironio protocol
In this scheme, Alice sends to Bob one of the follow-
ing six states: |+〉, |−〉, 1/√2(|0〉 ± i|1〉), and 1/√2|0〉 ±
(1 − i)/2|1〉 [57, 63]. On the receiving side, Bob mea-
sures each incoming signal with one of two possible mea-
surements corresponding to the bases 1/
√
2(|0〉±e−iφ|1〉)
with φ = {π/4,−π/4}, that he selects at random and in-
dependently for each signal, together with a projection
onto the vacuum state |vac〉.
When θ = 0, the maximum value of e tolerated by this
protocol, both for two-way and one-way post-processing,
coincides with the four-state protocol (see Fig. 3). The
case θ = π/8 is illustrated in Fig. 6.
The QBER is now given by
QBER =
1
2
[
(1− e) sin2 θ + e
]
. (B6)
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FIG. 6: Upper bound on the depolarising rate e as a func-
tion of the photon loss probability p for the QKD protocol in
Ref. [57] when θ = pi/8. Two-way classical post-processing
is illustrated with a solid line, while one-way classical post-
processing is represented with a dashed line for RR, and with
a dotted line for DR.
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